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Abstract and Keywords
Michela Massimi attempts to rescue Kitcher’s real realism from an 
inadequacy she believes it faces. She argues that his use of the 
distinction between idle wheels and working posits is inadequate in 
certain cases as a reply to Laudan’s historical argument against 
realism. Her perspectivalism, she maintains, provides the real realist 
with a preferable route to defending realism, since it does not privilege 
our own perspective. Where Kitcher relies on our own perspective to 
pick out those parts of theories that are deemed true from our own 
perspective (the working posits), her perspectival realism identifies 
claims that we have reason to believe are true since they are justifiably 
retained in the shift from the original perspective to the perspective(s) 
from which they are assessed.
Keywords:   idle wheels, Laudan, perspectival realism, Philip Kitcher, realism, real realism, 
working posits
1. Introduction
When it comes to debates on realism in science, Philip Kitcher’s (2001a)
“Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy” (henceforth abbreviated RR) 
occupies its well-deserved place among my top five must-read articles 
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published in the past forty years or so on the topic, alongside Putnam’s 
(1975) “What Is ‘Realism’?”; Boyd’s (1991) “Realism, Anti-
Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds”; Laudan’s 
(1981) “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”; and Psillos’s (2000) “The 
Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate.” Personal as this top-
five list may be, there is no doubt that “Real Realism” has ushered in a 
silent revolution. Without much fanfare it has shown that realism is 
hard to resist because it “begins at home” and “it never ventures into 
the metaphysical never-never-lands to which antirealists are so keen to 
banish their opponents” (RR 191). Kitcher has taught us how realism 
began with homely considerations such as those used by Galileo to 
persuade the Venetians about the reliability of his telescope to spot 
ships approaching the harbor. The following step, from “being a reliable 
naval instrument” to “being a reliable instrument, in general”—capable 
of revealing the craters of the Moon, the satellites of Jupiter, and the 
phases of Venus—was a short one.
The Galilean strategy that Kitcher has so admirably defended in 
“Real Realism” against both empiricism and constructivism (in their 
respective semantic and epistemic forms) entices us to a “homely line 
of thought” and warns us against any “Grand Metaphysical 
Conclusions.” Its impact cannot be underestimated. We all stand on 
Galileo’s shoulders with our defiant trust in science and technology to 
give us access to nature and its innermost secrets (pace empiricists’ 
intimations against 1-kilogram mortar and King Kong’s ability to break 
it). More to the point, we all stand on Kitcher’s Galilean grid in thinking 
of realism as a “homely” enterprise, where a divide et impera strategy 
of “working posits” and “idle wheels” can guarantee to the selective 
realist a cornucopia of past scientific results. Where to go from here?
Closer “home” is my reply. Whose home? The very home from which 
Kitcher (1981) began his intellectual journey in the early 1980s, with 
his reflections on explanatory unification as the battleground of two 
grand traditions: the Aristotelian tradition, whereby “scientists aim to 
fathom the order of being, an order that is typically opposed to the 
order of knowing;” and the Humean tradition (continued by Mach, 
Duhem, and the logical empiricists), which, on the contrary, argued for 
“no joints at which nature can be carved, no objective necessities, no 
mind-independent causal connections” (Kitcher 1986, 202). Against 
both traditions Kitcher defended a via media, leading out from Kant’s 
writings on the methodology of science onto the philosophy of science. 
Central to the Kantian project envisaged by the early Kitcher was an 
analysis of scientific knowledge and objective understanding that “does 
not depend on any mind-independent notions of causation, natural 
(p.99) 
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necessity, or natural kind” (204). Yet fifteen years later, in “Real 
Realism,” Kitcher took a stance against the Kantian tradition—in its 
epistemological constructivist outfit—holding that “the realists’ world is 
an inaccessible realm of noumena” (RR 188).
In this essay I suggest bringing real realism closer home, namely back 
to its Kantian roots. The very same roots that make real realism a 
“homely” kind of realism, against any Grand Metaphysical Conclusions 
about the world, its causal necessities, and natural kinds. In particular I 
suggest reinterpreting a key aspect of real realism—that is, the notion 
of success at stake in “working posits”—along more “homely” lines, 
lines that acknowledge historical continuity, conceptual nuances, and 
our role as epistemic agents in assessing success and inferring truth. 
(For some preliminary reflections, see Massimi 2012, 2014.) The result 
is a form of perspectival realism—to adopt Ron Giere’s (2006, 2013) 
terminology—which is, however, already at a distance from what Giere 
himself intends by this term (see Massimi 2015a). Hence my 
very own (loosely Kantian-inspired) perspectivalist slant to real realism.
Key to the Galilean strategy—as I see it through Kantian lenses (see 
Massimi 2010)—is not just to deploy the telescope to overcome 
fictitious boundaries (i.e., those between sea and land, Venice and 
Amsterdam, Heaven and Earth) but also to approach nature through 
principles of reason in one hand and “experiments thought out in 
accordance with these principles” in the other hand, “yet in order to be 
instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever 
the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels 
witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them” (Kant [1781–87] 
1997, Bxiii–xiv). This is how Kant famously portrayed Galileo’s 
contribution to bringing natural science onto the secure path of 
knowledge “after groping about for so many centuries.” It is this further
Galilean strategy that I turn my attention to here.
I cannot do justice to the breadth of the philosophical arguments that 
Kitcher’s real realism has put forward. And much as I’d like to discuss 
Kitcher’s articulated response both to the epistemological empiricism of 
van Fraassenean flavor and to the epistemological constructivism of 
Kantian descent,1 I have to leave those for another occasion. For here I 
concentrate on Kitcher’s influential response against the “blockish 
holism” of epistemological empiricism in its historical form (best 
expressed by Laudan 1981), which seems to assume that “a theory is 
false because it is not entirely true” (RR 170). In reply real realism 
insists “that the past successes stem from parts of the theories that are 
approximately correct,” (RR 170) namely from those hypotheses that 
(p.100) 
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are genuinely put to work (i.e., that characterize “working posits”), and 
are as such “approximately true.”
In section 2 I review Kitcher’s famous distinction between working 
posits and idle wheels in the context of his realist defense against the 
challenge coming from the history of science. In section 3 I focus on the 
notion of scientific success and distinguish between two variants: 
success “from within” and success “from above.” In section 4 I suggest 
a perspectivalist take on real realism in the form of a notion of success 
“from within,” able to assess success from a human vantage point and 
to capture truth across scientific perspectives. I conclude by 
considering possible objections and replies to the perspectival view 
canvassed in section 4.
2. Against the “Blockish Holism” of Epistemological 
Empiricism: Working Posits and Theoretical Excrescences
A powerful line of argument against realism has traditionally rehearsed 
a seemingly compelling historical point against the “success to truth” 
inference: that similar inferences “made by our predecessors would 
have issued in conclusions we now take to be quite wrong” (RR 168). 
Let us leave aside whether the list of past successful yet false theories 
reflect historical records or abide instead by the antirealist inclination 
to inflate examples. There are undoubtedly “prominent cases from the 
history of science in which views we now take to be false were 
genuinely successful by anyone’s standards” (168). Not surprisingly 
perhaps, Fresnel’s wave theory of light is one such favorite example. 
No matter how false the ether theory is, Fresnel’s ability to use his 
mathematical equations to predict a bright spot in the middle of a dark 
shade won skeptics like Poisson in the Paris Academy of Sciences and 
belies epistemological empiricists’ objection to realism. To the eyes of 
real realists, Fresnel’s wave theory of light is successful not in virtue of 
a tenuous distinction between structure and substance (pace structural 
realists). Instead its success was achieved via “approximately true 
descriptions of some of the features of light waves (the mathematical 
accounts) while being wrong about others” (RR 170) (i.e., how light 
waves propagate in the ether). The real realist sees Fresnel as 
employing many tokens of “light wave” to refer to electromagnetic 
waves and “as saying a large number of approximately true things 
about the properties of electromagnetic waves of the appropriate type,” 
despite the false opinion about the propagation of the waves through an 
elastic ether (RR 170).
Against the blockish holism of the antirealist that would invite us to 
regard as false a past theory that is no longer true by our own 
standards, the real realist recommends a divide et impera approach. 
(p.101) 
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Working posits are approximately true as long as they explain why past 
theories were successful (to the extent that they were), while idle 
wheels are “theoretical excrescences that are incorrect” (RR 170) and 
often entangled with working posits. Fresnel might not have 
distinguished between the two, but it is not a foregone conclusion that 
it would have been impossible for him to do so. Contemporary selective 
realists have made their own the real realist’s distinction between 
working posits and idle wheels. And the distinction continues to be, in 
my view, one of the most persuasive replies against antirealist 
challenges coming from the history of science.
However, a difficulty still awaits. For the objection against the 
structural realist—that the structure/substance dichotomy cannot easily 
be exported to other examples—can similarly be leveled against 
the real realist. Consider, for example, Aristotle’s theory of free fall as 
accelerated motion toward a natural place. The theory was undoubtedly 
successful by its own lights at the time, and it provided a springboard 
for medieval commentators (from Simplicius to Hipparchus and the 
Arabic commentators), whose views fed into the impetus theory of 
Buridan and Oresme, and ultimately into Galileo’s early Pisan studies 
on free fall (see Massimi 2010, 2015b). What are the working posits in 
Aristotle’s theory of free fall? And where do theoretical excrescences 
begin? Was Aristotle’s hypothesis that bodies get heavier nearer the 
Earth, an “idle wheel”? Well, it provided an explanation—in Aristotle’s 
own scientific perspective—of why free-falling bodies accelerate (as 
opposed to decelerate or move with constant speed) when moving 
toward their natural place (where, he assumed, bodies would regain 
their “form”). Moreover it suggested that there might have been forces 
acting on the body and pulling it either toward its natural place or in 
some different direction (what Avicenna and Abū’l-Barakāt called 
natural and violent mail and what Buridan called impetus, as an 
intrinsic force due to a natural gravity, which was in turn the ancestor 
of the early Galileo’s gravitas as a weight-related concept and 
ultimately of Newton’s gravitational mass). Was there anything
approximately (or even remotely) true in Aristotle’s theory? Or should 
we conclude that Aristotle’s theory was quite simply false? What has 
gone wrong with this example?
(p.102) 
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3. Success from Above and Success from Within: A Further 
Thought on Galileo’s Strategy
Here is a possible diagnosis. In replying to Laudan’s challenge to 
convergent realism, the real realist has himself employed too stringent 
a criterion in the divide et impera strategy: a criterion of success “from 
above” rather than “from within.” In Fresnel’s case, current 
electromagnetic theory provides the criterion of success to discern 
between the working posits of Fresnel’s theory (i.e., the equations for 
polarization by reflection, which still bear his name) and the idle wheels 
of the ether theory (long gone from contemporary textbooks). In 
Aristotle’s case, the criterion of success “from above” cannot similarly 
be deployed to distinguish between working posits and idle wheels. Too 
many centuries separate the Galilean-Newtonian theory of free fall 
from Aristotle’s, and all the conceptual nuances, small theoretical 
steps, and turning corners that the notion of free fall underwent in that 
span have long been forgotten (were it not for the assiduous work of 
dedicated historians of science).
It may well be that Aristotle’s theory is as promising as 
Fresnel’s when it comes to identifying parts of the theory that are 
essential to success (working posits), and hence approximately true. 
Scientists in Hipparchus’s time (or even in Buridan’s time) might still 
have been able to identify such parts. But we no longer are, because 
two millennia separate us from Aristotle. Thus if my diagnosis is 
correct, there is nothing wrong with the real realist’s divide et impera
strategy. What has gone wrong instead in the example of Aristotle’s free 
fall is the real realist’s tacit appeal to the scientific/convergent realist’s 
criterion of success “from above,” that is, from our very own current 
vantage point as if that vantage point were the best one to assess the 
past, or the one that provides a royal road to Truth with capital T.
The perspectival realist (of Kantian leaning) enters the scene. For the 
perspectival realist (of the kind I like) would rejoin that there is no 
privileged vantage point from which to assess scientific claims of the 
past. Our current vantage point is not a disguised Nagelian view from 
nowhere, providing special epistemic standards for assessing the past 
or a privileged access to the ontology of nature. Our current scientific 
perspective is only one among many others that our ancestors have 
happened to occupy and from which failure and success can be 
evaluated. Homely perspectival considerations of this kind invite us to 
embrace a more modest criterion of success from within when it comes 
to discerning between working posits and idle wheels.
(p.103) 
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The perspectival realist may adopt a Galilean strategy, namely the one 
adopted by Galileo in his early treatment of free fall in the Pisan 
treatise De Motu antiquiora (ca. 1590s), before he discovered the law of 
free fall (s: t2). Against Aristotle’s cause of motion (i.e., motion toward a 
natural place), Galileo looked for the “true cause” (vera causa) of 
accelerated motion in an Archimedean theory of buoyancy that could 
explain why bodies move up or down. But the analogy with 
Archimedean buoyancy could explain only uniform (not accelerated) 
motion. Hence Galileo had to resort to the medieval impetus theory of 
Buridan and Oresme in thinking of a weight-related concept of gravity 
(gravitas) as an internal static force that would decay during the free 
fall. Galileo’s momentum gravitatis (sometimes also referred to as 
impeto) is already at a distance from medieval impetus theory, as it is 
from Newton’s gravity, understood as an external impressed force 
acting at a distance between two bodies. Galileo’s gravity is still a 
weight-related internal force, compared to Newton’s thoroughly 
dynamical concept of gravity. Yet Galileo had to rethink the medieval 
concept of an internal force and make it obey “indubitable principles” 
so as to demonstrate the law of free fall. (For full details of this story, I 
refer the reader to Massimi 2010.)
Galileo’s kinematic studies exemplify the perspectivalist 
strategy of engaging with the past from within (rather than from 
above). Working with the Aristotelian tradition that goes from 
Hipparchus to the Arabic commentators and Buridan and Oresme’s 
impetus theory, Galileo could operate within well-trodden paths. He 
could resort to Archimedes’s buoyancy and Hipparchus’s theory of free 
fall and introduce gradual changes to key concepts. For example, the 
change from impetus as an internal force propelling a body to momento
(momentum gravitatis) as an internal force that, after having propelled 
the body, would gradually decay, causing the body to acquire degrees of 
speed (celeritatis momenta) in its descent. Galileo’s breakthrough 
about free fall did not happen by debunking the Aristotelian tradition 
(pace Galileo’s own rhetoric against Simplicius in Two New Sciences). 
Nor did it happen by selecting working posits in the Aristotelian 
tradition, for even Archimedean buoyancy and Hipparchus’s theory 
were inextricably entangled with idle wheels and not amenable to being 
imported tout court into the Galilean story.
Instead the Galilean kinematic strategy consisted in small theoretical 
steps and subtle conceptual nuances that ultimately allowed Galileo to 
turn the corner from the Aristotelian tradition. Galileo’s ability to 
interrogate nature with principles of reason on the one hand (i.e., the 
indubitable principles from which he demonstrated the law of free fall) 
(p.104) 
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and with experiments thought out in accordance with these principles 
on the other hand (i.e., both thought experiments with chords and real 
experiments with inclined planes) made the revolutionary shift possible. 
The perspectival realist can appeal to this Galilean strategy to bring the 
real realist’s notion of success back home: from above to within.
4. Success and Truth across Scientific Perspectives
But how should the perspectivalist notion of success from within be 
understood? So far I have simply suggested that it should not be 
understood as the ability of inquirers to identify parts of a theory that 
are essential to success and hence approximately true. But this can 
hardly be enough to understand the perspectivalist move I am 
suggesting for real realism. We need to unpack the slogan.
In what follows I take my cue from broader discussions on 
perspectivalism in contemporary epistemology to propose that success 
from within should be understood as success with respect to standards 
of performance adequacy appropriate to the scientific perspective of 
the inquirer when assessed from the point of view of another 
(either diachronically subsequent or synchronically rival) scientific 
perspective.2
Given the Aristotelian-Archimedean perspective and the available 
evidence for free fall, Galileo could conclude that the Aristotelians 
failed to satisfy standards of performance adequacy appropriate to their 
own perspective in the explanation of the phenomenon. For example, 
Aristotle’s theory could not explain the precise mechanism through 
which equal degrees of speed accrued during the descent, and hence 
why motion toward a natural place was uniformly accelerated motion. 
The Aristotelians could not obviously be blamed for having believed 
what they believed about free fall (i.e., that it was motion toward a 
natural place) given their own scientific perspective. And the 
proposition that free fall was motion toward a natural place cannot be 
regarded as relatively true (i.e., true for the Aristotelians but false for 
Galileo), on pain of abandoning realism altogether for alethic 
relativism.
Scientific perspectives, I suggest, provide contexts of assessments for 
scientific claims. Galileo could assess the Aristotelian claims about free 
fall and find them lacking in satisfying what, from Galileo’s own 
perspective, were the standards of performance adequacy appropriate 
to the Aristotelian epistemic context (e.g., Why is free fall as motion 
toward a natural place accelerated motion and not uniform motion, as 
one should expect from the analogy with Archimedean buoyancy?). In 
answering these questions Galileo came eventually to establish a new 
(p.105) 
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scientific perspective, from which it became possible to evaluate new 
claims about free fall. His scientific perspective, in turn, can be found 
lacking in satisfying what, from our own current perspective, are the 
standards of performance adequacy appropriate to the Galilean-
Newtonian epistemic context (e.g., How to think of Galilean free fall 
when sense impressions about the free mobility of rigid bodies and 
paths of light rays get called into question, as they were with 
Helmholtz’s mirror sphere thought experiment, for example? What 
becomes of Galilean-Newtonian gravity in a non-Euclidean space?).
Success from within is then the ability of a theory to perform 
adequately with respect to standards that are appropriate to the 
theory’s wider epistemic context—or scientific perspective, as I prefer 
to call it—when assessed from the point of view not just of the scientific 
perspective at stake but, crucially, from the point of view of other 
scientific perspectives. Building on recent important work in 
epistemology,3 I suggest the following definition.
A scientific claim (SC) meets the criterion of success from within iff:
(a) SC expresses a proposition p at scientific perspective SP1
(b) p is true (i.e., corresponds to states of affairs in nature) and
meets standards of performance adequacy in SP1 when assessed 
from other scientific perspectives SP2, SP3, SP4 …
This definition of success from within vindicates the real realist’s 
expectations for successful posits to track truths in nature (via the first 
part of premise (b)). Yet it is perspectival in giving up on both a 
Nagelian view from nowhere and a convergent realist’s/real realist’s 
view from here now: it does not take our currently successful scientific 
claims as the gold standard for assessing past failures and successes.
Success from within is kosher to the Kantian spirit of perspectivalism in 
giving due consideration to epistemic agents’ (or, I should say, scientific 
communities’) commitment to scientific claims (without dismissing 
them out of hand as sheer errors of the past). Success from within does 
justice to historians’ anti-Whiggish plea for judging past theories in 
their own terms and by their own standards (not by ours) when 
assessed from the point of view of other (diachronically subsequent or 
synchronically rival) scientific perspectives. At the same time, it avoids 
the perils of truth relativism by anchoring success to the truth 
of perspective-independent states of affairs. That free fall is accelerated 
motion is a perspective-independent state of affairs that either holds in 
nature or does not. But that accelerated motion is, in turn, motion 
toward a natural place (as opposed to motion due to a force of gravity) 
(p.106) 
(p.107) 
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is a scientific claim that can be assessed only within a given epistemic 
context, with its standards of performance adequacy, and so forth. At 
the same time, standards of performance adequacy in and of 
themselves cannot be entrusted with the goal of delivering success 
from within.
For example, it is not enough for Aristotelians to be satisfied with their 
own theory of free fall (and their associated standards of performance 
adequacy) for it to count as successful. Scientific communities cannot 
ratify their own success if their practices are not deemed successful by 
other communities of inquirers. Yet other communities cannot in turn 
smuggle in their own standards of performance adequacy when 
evaluating other (past or rival) theories. A scientific claim proves 
inadequate (and hence unsuccessful) when the content of the claim is 
false and it fails to meet its own standards of performance adequacy 
when assessed from another perspective.4
It was possible for Galileo to assess Aristotle’s theory of free fall by 
Aristotle’s own standards (expressed by Simplicius in Two New 
Sciences) and conclude about its inadequacy. As it was possible for 
William Thomson (later known as Lord Kelvin) in 1847 to assess 
Carnot’s cycle by Carnot’s own standards (which included conservation 
of caloric) and conclude about its inadequacy (when combined with 
Joule’s claim that a quantity of heat proportional to the mechanical 
work produced must be consumed in a paddle-wheel experiment).5
These examples show important features about the definition of 
success from within I just gave:
1. The relevant standards of performance adequacy for scientific 
claims are settled in the original context of use, that is, in the 
scientific perspective in which the claim is first formulated and 
advanced.
2. Subsequent perspectives provide contexts of assessment from 
which it is still possible to evaluate past scientific claims by their 
own original standards.
3. Given the richer informational content available to subsequent 
perspectives, it may be possible for later assessors to regard the 
performance adequacy of past claims as lacking in some 
respects; hence it is possible for later assessors to either retain 
or withdraw (in whole or in part) past scientific claims on the 
basis of their continuing performance adequacy.
(p.108) 
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Success from within then becomes a commitment that a community of 
epistemic agents undertakes to retain past scientific claims when their 
performance adequacy continues to be regarded as satisfactory from 
the point of view of later scientific perspectives. Success from within 
bears important similarities with the real realist’s working posits. Both 
react against the blockish holism of epistemological empiricism. 
Against scientific realism they both invite us to a more nuanced 
reappraisal of past theories. Against structural realism they both 
refrain from cashing out success in terms of structure versus 
substance. And both equally stress what might be called the enactive
nature of scientific success: success is whatever works or continues to 
perform adequately.
Yet real realists and perspectival realists differ when it comes to the 
notion of success. For real realists deploy working posits to identify 
hypotheses that are approximately true by the criterion of success from 
above. Whereas perspectival realists of the kind I like would urge to 
deploy success from within to identify scientific claims that—by being 
justifiably retained in the shift from the original perspective/context of 
use to another perspective/context of assessment—we have reasons for 
thinking of as true (to the best of our knowledge). The perspectival 
slant I am offering to the real realist’s working posits is then in terms of 
commitment of a scientific community to assess and justifiably retain 
past scientific claims whenever their performance adequacy continues 
to be deemed satisfactory by their own original standards when 
assessed from the vantage point of other perspectives.
On this perspectival reading truth is not an ex post facto explanation of 
the ongoing success of some scientific claims. Instead truth is built into 
the aforementioned definition from the ground up, with the first 
conjunct of premise (b): “p is true.” It is the truth of the propositional 
content of a scientific claim together with the ability of the claim to 
meet standards of performance adequacy at SP1 (when assessed from 
other scientific perspectives) that ultimately ground success from 
within. And I do not mean “explanatorily ground” it. I mean instead that 
“ontologically ground” it. If the propositional content of the claim were 
false by realist lights (i.e., if there were no such a thing as p in nature), 
even if the claim were hypothetically able to meet standards of 
performance adequacy when assessed from other perspectives, the 
claim would not qualify as successful under the criterion of success 
from within.
Imagine a scientific community in the eighteenth century that could 
have built a perfectly consistent scientific system around caloric to 
advance various claims about the production of mechanical work, 
(p.109) 
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thermal expansion, and matter’s states of aggregation, among others. 
Our best eighteenth-century scientists failed to distinguish among 
states of aggregation as physical in nature (and went on to identify 
water as a liquid chemical substance; see Kuhn 1990). But let us 
assume that our hypothetical community can do better than our own 
Lavoisier, Dalton, and Carnot and come up with a perfectly good system 
of knowledge around caloric that meets their own standards of 
performance adequacy at the time.
For example, such system proves consistent when offering explanations 
in terms of caloric for matter’s states of aggregation and the production 
of mechanical work; it gives simple and elegant accounts of how caloric 
(by being released and absorbed) underlies all these phenomena; it 
seems accurate with respect to the evidence available to the community 
at the time; and so on. Should we not judge—from our own current 
perspective—such a community as having met its own standards of 
performance adequacy? Should we not assess its scientific claims as 
being successful, despite their propositional contents (in terms of 
caloric) being false? More to the point, who are we to conclude that 
their propositional content is indeed false? Are not we reintroducing a 
much-dreaded view from nowhere to reach such a cross-perspectival 
Grand Metaphysical Conclusion?
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5. Objections and Replies
Not so fast. What needs be considered in this imaginary case is whether 
positing caloric can indeed give rise to such a perfect system of 
knowledge able to meet all the aforementioned standards by the light of 
the hypothetical eighteenth-century community. I contend that it 
cannot. Consistent explanations first. Assuming caloric is an 
imponderable fluid—as eighteenth-century scientists did and our 
hypothetical scientists would presumably also do—would immediately 
pose severe challenges to any attempt to provide a consistent 
explanation of mechanical work and states of aggregation. Mechanical 
work would require caloric to be consumed (pace conservation of 
caloric), as much as turning water into ice would require removing 
caloric (qua a shell of imponderable fluid surrounding water’s particles) 
and yet expanding the overall volume. How can water’s particles lose 
part of their volume (by releasing caloric), while also expanding their 
overall volume? Caloric does not seem to license consistent 
explanations.
Simplicity next (a notoriously slippery standard, if any). Would caloric 
provide a simple and elegant account of various phenomena? Caloric 
could be squeezed out of particles’ volumes (assuming a Daltonian 
model) and get reattached to them at ease. As simple as that? Well, 
assuming some mechanism was in place to explain what held caloric 
attached to the particles of matter, what had the power to detach it 
from matter and reattach it at will, and so forth. Perhaps some 
attractive and repulsive forces might do the trick. Or perhaps electrical 
fluids. Or some ethereal substratum (along the lines of Kant’s matter of 
heat). Simplicity is not within easy reach. A complex story would have 
to be told about the mechanisms underlying caloric’s behavior in all 
these phenomena, mechanisms that can potentially be at odds with 
each other.
Perhaps accuracy with the available evidence fares better than 
consistency and simplicity when it comes to standards of performance 
adequacy. Let us assume our hypothetical community has produced a 
system of scientific claims that are accurate by the experimental 
standards available to the community at the time. Such claims must 
surely be regarded as successful (no matter how false caloric is from 
our current vantage point). An analogy may help here. Suppose I have 
an accurate story about hedgehogs living in my garden and creeping 
out at night to collect the mulberries that have fallen on the ground. My 
story is so accurate that it tells me with precision that hedgehogs come 
at night, between 1 and 2 a.m., from the far right corner of the garden, 
(p.110) 
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behind the hedge, and collect only the juiciest mulberries they can get 
their spiky claws on. So my available evidence of red mulberries on the 
ground seems to support the accuracy of my story.
But is accuracy such a malleable standard? Surely, even my garden 
hedgehogs would have to respond to some mundane questions: Do they 
come out every night? From 1 a.m. or from 2 a.m.? What about the 
purple spots on the ground that look like old juiciest mulberries getting 
moldy? Accuracy (be it the accuracy of a measurement or the accuracy 
of a scientific claim) comes always in tandem with other standards, 
such as consistency, fruitfulness, and explanatory power. Our 
imagined eighteenth-century caloric supporters would have to tell a 
pretty convincing story about how their scientific claims involving 
caloric were accurate over and above fitting a sample of observed 
regularities (especially if such sample proved in conflict with others, 
and the caloric mechanisms envisaged in each case were in 
contradiction with each other and hard to pin down).
Whatever the standards of this hypothetical eighteenth-century 
community could have been (the list above, of Kuhnian flavor, is only 
illustrative and is not meant to be exhaustive), the examples should 
make it clear that building a system of scientific claims on an 
ontologically false ground is not going to go very far. The system of 
claims would soon fail by its very own standards of performance 
adequacy. And we do not have to resort to hypothetical scenarios. Real 
historical communities that entertained standards similar to the ones 
listed above came to realize the inadequacy of the caloric theory in the 
nineteenth century.
Let us take stock. A critic was envisaged that challenged the criterion 
of success from within on the ground that as long as a community can 
justifiably be regarded as meeting its own standards of performance 
adequacy, the scientific claims advanced on behalf of such standards 
should count as successful (despite their propositional contents being 
false). This objection attacks the realist component in my definition of 
success from within, namely the first conjunct in premise (b): “p is 
true.” For it would seem possible for p to be false and yet still meet 
standards of performance adequacy in a given scientific perspective so 
that scientific claims about p would count as successful (despite p being 
false). In response I have shown how if p were false, it would prove in 
practice impossible to justifiably meet standards of performance 
adequacy in a given scientific perspective. And for good reasons too: ex 
falso quodlibet. An ontologically false ground (e.g., caloric) cannot 
possibly license scientific claims that are arguably consistent, simple, 
accurate, and so on (unless inconsistency, inaccuracy, and so forth are 
(p.111) 
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themselves acceptable standards within a particular scientific 
perspective).6 Thus I conclude that if the propositional content of the 
scientific claim were false by realist lights (i.e., if there were no such a 
thing as p in nature, and hence the first conjunct of my premise (b) did 
not hold), it would in practice be impossible for the claim to meet 
standards of performance adequacy in its own scientific 
perspective (and even more so when assessed from other perspectives). 
In other words, it is not the case that p is false and nonetheless meets 
standards of performance adequacy in a given perspective. A scientific 
claim of this kind would not satisfy the criterion of success from within.
A different kind of worry may be raised at this point. Isn’t the truth of 
the propositional content p enough to secure success from within? 
Aren’t the standards of performance adequacy themselves idle wheels, 
not necessary to secure success? Here a different critic is envisaged, 
who may retort that a real realist’s working posits ultimately underpin 
the truth of p, and my definition of success from within collapses onto 
the real realist’s success from above at a closer inspection. The critic 
may insist that Fresnel’s theory worked and proved successful not 
because it met standards of performance adequacy in Fresnel’s time 
(e.g., it was fruitful in predicting novel phenomena; it seemed accurate 
in explaining polarization by reflection; and so forth) but because 
Fresnel’s “light wave” referred to electromagnetic waves of high 
frequency. Or better, Fresnel’s theory met those standards because its 
working posits (i.e., electromagnetic waves) were true. And to 
emphasize the idleness of the standards of performance adequacy 
themselves, one could easily invoke consistency with the ether theory 
as an example. (Yes, Fresnel’s theory was consistent with popular ether 
theories at the time, yet consistency in and of itself does not cut any ice 
for the success of Fresnel’s theory.)
In reply one may consider what would happen to a lone researcher who 
gets it right without yet meeting the standards of performance 
adequacy of her community at the time (perhaps because such 
community has not quite gotten to the stage of precisifying standards 
able to capture the truth of what the lone researcher has just 
discovered). Should we conclude that the researcher has been 
successful? Here I cannot help but share Richard Boyd’s negative 
answer to this question,7 although I give a perspectival gloss to what he 
portrays as the social dimension of scientific inquiry. That “p is true” is 
not sufficient by itself to ontologically ground success, unless p also
meets standards of performance adequacy at SP1 when assessed from 
another scientific perspective.
(p.112) 
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Consider the astronomer V. M. Slipher, who, at the Lowell Observatory 
in Arizona throughout 1912–17, was able to measure with precision the 
radial velocity of galaxies and to empirically establish that galaxies 
were expanding a decade before Hubble found the law for this 
phenomenon, and at a time when Einstein was introducing his 
cosmological constant in the equations of general relativity to secure a 
static universe.8 Slipher was the lone brilliant experimentalist who got 
it right in a scientific perspective dominated by general relativity with 
Einstein’s and de Sitter’s interpretation of the field equations as 
implying static solutions. It was only in 1924 that Friedmann first, and 
then Lemaître in 1927 introduced models of general relativity that 
implied non-static solutions to the field equations, with Hubble 
introducing the law to measure the redshifting of galaxies in 1929. 
Once the idea of an expanding universe became a live option for 
scientists, it also became possible to go back to Slipher’s experimental 
findings and to assess them as meeting the standards of performance 
adequacy of the scientific perspective of the time. For example, their 
consistency with non-static solutions of Einstein’s field equations that 
Friedmann and other cosmologists were bringing to the fore in the 
1920s. Using Supernova Ia techniques, current cosmologists can still 
assess the performance adequacy of Slipher’s findings, despite his 
pioneering work being overlooked for a long time by his own peers, 
who had not yet precisified the standards of performance adequacy 
appropriate to their scientific perspective.
To conclude, success from within does not fall back onto success from 
above because ontologically true grounds in and of themselves (without 
also meeting standards of performance adequacy at the time) are 
necessary but not sufficient to license success. Scientific success is 
what a community of epistemic agents acknowledges and welcomes as 
such at any given time. The truth of the propositional contents of our 
scientific claims—the first conjunct in my premise (b)—by itself would 
grant only a view of success from nowhere, a view that no epistemic 
community (either here now or back then) would recognize as its own.
Success from within has both a realist and a perspectival component. 
Correspondence with perspective-independent states of affairs and
meeting perspectival standards of performance adequacy (which can be 
assessed by other agents across perspectives) are both key to the 
success of our scientific claims (of today and of the past). Success from 
within is not the success of those who historically happened to be the 
winners. It is instead the success of those who were responsible for the 
(p.113) 
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scientific findings and their ongoing performance adequacy as still 
assessed by us today.
6. Envoi
Fifteen years after “Real Realism” we are all heirs of Galileo’s strategy. 
We learned from Kitcher’s real realism how to tell truth from falsehood, 
how to discern bits that work from idle wheels, and most of all how to 
believe in the reliability of the deliverances of our instruments. 
Empiricists and constructivists of all stripes owe us an argument for 
maintaining a justifiable degree of skepticism about science and its 
success. More to the point, they owe us an argument for justifiably 
retreating into “metaphysical never-never-lands” on the face of so many 
homely arguments for being realists about the things with which we 
interact all the time.
For myself and for my generation real realism has enticed us to explore 
new avenues and encouraged us to appraise success and failure across 
the history of science in a careful way. Maybe success from above 
should leave room for success from within. We stand on Galileo’s 
shoulders by acknowledging our continuity with the past and our ability 
to assess past scientific claims by their own lights and from our current 
vantage point, a vantage point that is neither metaphysically nor 
epistemically privileged. That is how, in my view, a perspectival slant 
can help us bring real realism back to the Kantian home, to which it 
naturally belongs.
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Reply to Massimi
Philip Kitcher
Michela Massimi offers a subtle response to my real realism, in the 
spirit of the valuable—but these days all too rare—tradition of history 
and philosophy of science. She begins with what she identifies 
as a problem for my views and proceeds to develop a form of 
perspectivism aimed at further articulating real realism. I agree that 
real realism might profitably be elaborated by incorporating 
perspectivist ideas and that this might enable a more adequate 
treatment of the science of the past.
It is helpful to start with a brief review of the difficulty that my notions 
of working posits and idle wheels were intended to solve. In his classic 
paper, Larry Laudan (1981) claimed that the confident realist defense of 
the approximate truth of “mature sciences,” by appeal to the success of 
those sciences, was vulnerable to a straightforward historical 
challenge. According to Laudan, the scientific past is full of theories 
that are now regarded as false but that were taken to be true on the 
basis of their supposed successes. What right do we have to hold that 
our predicament is different? We look around and see success 
everywhere—but so did our predecessors, even though their theories 
were false.
In my 1993a book I offered a double reply to Laudan. First, I charged 
that his list of false theories successful in their own time was inflated. 
Second, I proposed that, in the instances of genuinely successful past 
practices, the theories in question were not entirely false—and the 
successes are to be explained by noting that they depend only on claims 
that remain, by our lights, true. Hence the thought that success 
depends on truth is restored. “Real Realism” (Kitcher 2001a) goes 
further by trying to locate the success-to-truth inference in the homely 
background of which both Massimi and I approve.
The divide-and-conquer strategy is to pick out the working posits of 
past science, the true claims and the genuine bits of nature to which 
our predecessors referred, seeing those as responsible for the past 
successes. These working posits are distinguished from the idle wheels, 
the constituents of past theories that played no positive role in 
successful practice. The example of Fresnel’s wave theory of light is 
exemplary. Fresnel was correct to view light as having a wavelike 
aspect and to characterize wave propagation as he did. He erred in 
supposing that any wave motion must have a medium in which the 
waves are propagated and thus introducing an all-pervasive ether.
(p.115) 
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One of Massimi’s worries is that this line of solution will not apply 
broadly enough. She cites the example of theories of free fall in the 
Aristotelian tradition. On her account real realism faces a dilemma: 
either one must import elements from later science into Aristotle’s 
framework, or it’s necessary to dismiss his theory as thoroughly false. 
The former option distorts the content of Aristotelian claims; the latter 
dismisses Aristotelianism too bluntly.
I reply by trying to specify the exact claims at issue. In the 
Aristotelian tradition the terms we translate as “free fall” pick out the 
motions of bodies after their release as they tend toward the earth’s 
surface. Some contexts will fix the reference of those terms by 
importing theoretical ideas from Aristotle; for example, free fall will be 
taken to be a motion toward a natural place. On other occasions, 
however, thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition refrain from any such 
theoretical imposition: free fall is just the downward motion of a body 
that has been released. Call these the strong and the weak senses, 
respectively. Consider now the statement “Bodies in free fall accelerate 
as they approach the earth’s surface.” When Aristotelians make claims 
we properly translate by this statement (and, of course, they don’t use 
accelerate!), everything turns on the sense we assign to free fall. In the 
strong sense, if the logical form is taken to be a universal 
generalization, the claim is vacuously true, since nothing satisfies the 
antecedent. In the weak sense, however, the claim is a true empirical 
generalization, one that might be used to make some modest predictive 
successes. On this reading Aristotelians are claiming (correctly) that, 
when released, heavy bodies gain velocity in their motion toward the 
earth. It’s thus possible for real realism, in its original form, to endorse 
parts of the Aristotelian view as correct and as predictively successful 
in consequence of their correctness.
The approach just sketched appears to make progress with a problem 
Massimi raises for me, but it remains historically crude, unable to make 
sense of the subtle conceptual shifts that lead from Hipparchus through 
Buridan to Galileo (early and mature). But before I outline some 
measures for refining the historical treatment, introducing a form of 
perspectivism akin to Massimi’s, it’s important to see how the problem 
of understanding the conceptual shifts is different from that of 
responding to Laudan’s actual skeptical argument.
Historians, and historically sensitive philosophers, often writhe when 
they encounter judgments about the truth of particular claims made in 
the scientific past, especially when that past is quite distant. By what 
right do we adopt a “view from nowhere,” judging the correspondence 
of (say) Aristotle’s words with nature? The answer is that real realists 
(p.116) 
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don’t adopt a view from nowhere but a view from right here, and they 
do so because it’s forced on them by the skeptical challenge. Laudan 
and the antirealists who follow him introduce that view. Here’s the 
challenge: “You realists believe that success indicates truth. But there 
are many past successful scientific theories that you regard, by your 
own lights, as false, so success can’t reliably indicate truth.” Evaluating 
bits and pieces of past science as correct from the perspective of 
contemporary science is an intrinsic part of any response to Laudan’s 
celebrated argument.
Massimi’s perspectivism steps sideways from Laudan’s actual 
challenge—although, as I’ll explain shortly, there’s something important 
that motivates her. Before attending to that motivation, however, I want 
to point out an interesting feature of her perspectivism. Her condition 
(b) seems to make a stronger claim than is pertinent to Laudan-style 
skepticism: the first conjunct (the truth of the proposition) is enough. 
Why, then, add the second, which might hold all pieces of past science 
hostage to some thoroughly misguided and regressive scientific 
perspective, one so badly informed that it judges all the rest to fail in 
their own terms? Perhaps the condition might be more plausible as a 
disjunction rather than a conjunction—an interpretive idea inspired by 
her remark about lack of success. (“A scientific claim proves inadequate 
(and hence unsuccessful) when the content of the claim is false and it 
fails to meet its own standards of performance adequacy when assessed 
from another perspective.” The negation of (b), as it stands, should be a 
disjunction.)
But this is to miss the insight motivating Massimi. She (reasonably) 
wants (b) to approach truth-claims via using other perspectives to judge 
the performance adequacy of the focal perspective by its own lights 
(avoiding the “view from nowhere” and denying any privileged role to 
the “view from here”). As I’ve said, to proceed along those lines fails to 
mesh with Laudan’s skeptical argument as actually posed. On 
Massimi’s view, as I understand it, Laudan’s deep interest in 
destabilizing our contemporary views should lead him to be suspicious 
of the notion of success he actually adopts in his critique of convergent 
realism: he should not be content with evaluation “from above” but 
should ask the realist to show that success depends on truth, when the 
truth of elements of past science are assessed from within. The 
convergent realist (or the real realist) ought to show that the evaluation 
is stable as one proceeds from the original practice through the 
sequence of practices that succeed it. In this way both the critic and the 
realist avoid taking any standpoint as privileged. Massimi claims that 
Laudan’s challenge should have asked for something stronger, namely 
(p.117) 
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the stability of the judgments about success and truth under evaluation 
from within. Combining my crude original approach to Aristotelian 
language with the more subtle schemes of translation available from 
perspectives intermediate between Aristotle and us (e.g., those of 
Hipparchus, Buridan, and others), I think the realist can meet this 
stronger challenge.
In my view the deep motivation for introducing the idea of evaluation 
from within stems from Kuhn’s seminal reflections on the languages of 
past science. When you examine the subtle ways in which later 
Aristotelians discussed free fall (reviewed in some of Massimi’s 
illuminating historical studies), the translations I offered in evading her 
original dilemma seem remarkably blunt. Following Kuhn 
(especially 2000), we might declare the central claims of Aristotelians 
to be literally untranslatable. I’d prefer to put the Kuhnian point 
differently: we can arrive at approximative translations, highly context-
dependent and requiring preliminary glosses to show the ways 
Aristotelian and modern terms cut across one another. Neither the 
Kuhnian version nor my preferred alternative vitiates the basic point 
that Aristotle’s successors achieved an insight we can best capture with 
the formulation “Bodies in free fall accelerate as they approach the 
earth’s surface”—and it’s precisely by attributing that insight to them 
that Laudan-style skepticism is answered (in the particular instance).
Real realism needs extension, in my view, because it should appreciate 
the limitations of the translations advanced in combating skepticism. 
Massimi is right to suppose that, through a sequence of theoretical 
developments of a large perspective (say, Aristotelianism), the more 
immediate descendants are more able to reconstruct and explain the 
ideas of their predecessors than those who come later: once the 
working posits and idle wheels have been identified (by us!), Buridan is 
a better interpreter of the terms used by Hipparchus in characterizing 
them than is Galileo, and Galileo, in turn, does better than we can. If we 
can attribute a core insight about acceleration toward the earth (as I 
think we can), we must also recognize that the Aristotelian terms in 
which that insight is expressed are alien to us and that they are less 
strange to those who are closer to the Aristotelian worldview.
Recognition invites the idea of a sequence of perspectives, 
distinguished by ways of conceptualizing the phenomena (in this 
instance, phenomena of motion), in which close successors are better 
able to capture the claims of their predecessors. To rebut Laudan’s 
skepticism it’s enough to show that where there’s success there’s an 
underlying use of correct ideas, often expressed in what much later 
scientists see as highly peculiar ways. A much deeper understanding of 
(p.118) 
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the phenomena of success, and how it’s won, requires the historian-
philosopher-of-science to reconstruct the perspectives of the past, 
tracing their continuities with the present.
I read Massimi as aiming to avoid any privileging of the contemporary 
standpoint, the “view from here.” For me, the principal motivation for 
perspectivism stems from the shortcomings of the translations used in 
reconstructing the successes of past science. In the rest of this 
response I’ll trace a route to my preferred version of perspectivism.
Massimi draws from Kant (as I once did). My sources these days are the 
classical pragmatists. On my interpretation of Peirce, James, and 
Dewey, none of them rejects my favorite (post-Tarskian) version of 
correspondence truth for scientific statements (see Kitcher 2012c, ch. 
5). Yet James and Dewey (especially) are struck by the plurality 
of frameworks in which scientific truths can be embedded. Both of 
them view the world—in the rich sense in which the world contains 
determinate objects divided into kinds—as partially constructed by the 
community of inquirers, with some features of that construction 
reflecting aspects of human psychology and others responding to our 
evolving interests. So at different stages in the development of a 
science, alternative languages will be articulated, specifying different 
spatiotemporal boundaries for objects, different groupings of things 
into kinds, different termini for processes, and different standards for 
normality. None of these languages is privileged in the sense of 
conforming to the intrinsic structure of an independent reality. 
Conceived as what is independent of the subject, reality doesn’t come 
with that much structure. With respect to different human purposes, 
however, some languages may function better than others.
A thorough evaluation of some past perspective would start with 
reconstructing its language, exposing the ways its categories cut across 
those of the present. It would proceed to delineate the goals at which 
inquiry aimed, what questions investigators selected as especially 
significant, and what standards were adduced for answering them. On 
this basis it would explore the extent to which those investigators 
succeeded in attaining their goals, why they were successful when they 
were, and why they failed when they did.
So far the historian-philosopher-of-science is using the contemporary 
perspective to study and to appreciate a past perspective in its own 
terms. Mindful, however, of the large degree to which the languages 
cut across one another, with consequent inadequacy of translation, a 
historically sensitive philosopher may explore the intermediate 
perspectives, using the more immediate descendants as superior guides 
(p.119) 
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to the structure of the ancestor. In the end the full sequence of 
perspectives may serve as the most adequate standard against which 
ancestral success is judged. If I am right, that conforms in important 
respects to the perspectivism Massimi prefers. It is, however, couched 
in a different philosophical idiom and directed at a different 
philosophical problem.
In my view real realism fights on many fronts. As my 2001a paper tries 
to show, real realism opposes several varieties of empiricism and 
constructivism. Laudan’s skepticism is akin to one strain of empiricist 
argument, and it is among the objections I have been concerned to 
rebut. My current view, however, is that Kuhn’s ideas about conceptual 
incommensurability, particularly as they were elaborated in his later 
writings (Kuhn 2000), offer an equally important challenge, demanding 
of real realists that they offer a more nuanced view of scientific 
success, past and present. The neopragmatist perspectivism I 
have sketched attempts to take up that challenge.
In the end, I think, a perspectivalist real realism is doubly motivated—
and we don’t have to choose which rationale is more important. 
Massimi views Laudan’s use of evaluation from above as betraying one 
of his central insights; thus she introduces a more probing account of 
success and elaborates real realism with respect to it. I have been more 
troubled by a Kuhnian challenge. But we come out in much the same 
place. This is not so much because of the resurgence of my lapsed 
Kantianism as through celebration of a characterization Kuhn came to 
relish: he was redoing Kant with movable categories. So too, I believe, 
were the classical pragmatists. Real realism should continue the 
enterprise.
Notes:
(1.) Against the epistemological constructivists of Kantian descent 
invoking a “distinction between objects-as-experienced and objects-in-
themselves” (RR 189), real realism responds that “the objects we claim 
to represent accurately are not mysterious noumena but, in many 
cases, the things with which we interact all the time” (189).
(p.120) 
Bringing Real Realism Back Home
Page 24 of 26
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: 
University of Edinburgh; date: 08 November 2017
(2.) See, for example, Sosa’s perspectival coherentism (part of his 
virtue perspectivism in Sosa 1991), where the justification for beliefs is 
a matter of perspectival coherence. Along similar lines, on perspectival 
justification for beliefs, please see Haack (1993) and Rosenberg (2002, 
149): “The reason that we correctly judge that S does not know that p is 
that, given our richer informational state, we recognize that what we 
are (stipulatively) entitled to take to be S’s epistemic circumstances 
demand a higher level of scrutiny than we are supposing S himself to 
have exercised. S therefore, has not satisfied what, from our 
perspective, are the standards of performance-adequacy appropriate to 
his epistemic circumstances, and hence, from our epistemic 
perspective, we judge that, despite his not having acted irresponsibly 
given the information available to him (judged from his own legitimate 
perspective on his epistemic circumstances), he has not justifiably come 
to believe that p.” In what follows I latch onto and expand upon 
Rosenberg’s appeal to standards of performance adequacy, but in a 
different context and with a different purpose in mind. My goal is not to 
elaborate a perspectivalist theory of belief justification but instead to 
elaborate a perspectivalist notion of success from within that can serve 
the purpose of success-to-truth-inferences in the realism debate.
(3.) Here I want to latch onto the helpful distinction between context of 
use and context of assessment in discussions on relativized truth and 
faultless disagreement. See MacFarlane (2005, 2009) and Marques 
(2014), among many others. By contrast with MacFarlane, I will not be 
using this distinction to defend any notion of relativized truth. Instead I 
make use of MacFarlane’s distinction between context of use and 
context of assessment to provide a notion of success in science that 
does not beg the question for scientific realism (i.e., that does not judge 
past theories on the basis of our current successful theories).
(4.) On closer reflection, this is what is to be expected from Kuhnian 
anomalies and periods of crisis. Anomalies reveal cracks in well-
established and well-trodden paradigms by revealing the inability of the 
paradigm to handle in its own terms an increasing number of persistent 
problems.
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(5.) Following up on Thomson, in 1850 Rudolf Clausius laid the 
foundations of thermodynamics (let us call it SP2) by reconciling 
Carnot’s cycle with Joule’s ideas. For Clausius envisaged that it was 
possible to retain Carnot’s idea that heat passes from a hot reservoir to 
a cold one whenever mechanical work is done in a cyclic process, while 
also abandoning Carnot’s additional claim about conservation of 
caloric. The second law of thermodynamics was born: in any cyclic 
transformation of thermal energy into mechanical energy, a portion of 
heat gets dissipated irreversibly (pace caloric theory). Subsequent 
perspectives, such as Maxwell-Boltzmann statistical mechanics (let us 
call it SP3) were still able to evaluate the truth of Carnot’s cycle and its 
ability to meet standards of performance adequacy in its own time (i.e., 
measuring engines’ efficiency in producing mechanical work). Yet in the 
light of the richer informational content available to Maxwell and 
Boltzmann (after Clausius’s introduction of entropy), Carnot’s overall 
claim was deemed as requiring a higher level of scrutiny (about 
conservation of caloric and the nature of heat) than Carnot himself 
could have possibly exercised in the early nineteenth century.
(6.) Here a relativist may come to the fore and make this kind of 
rejoinder. (One is reminded of the familiar story about the Azande and 
their witchcraft and how standards of adequacy vary from one 
epistemic community to another. See Kusch 2002 for a helpful 
discussion.) A discussion of relativism would lead me into territory 
farther afield from the topic of my essay here, and as such I will not 
pursue it.
(7.) Boyd (2010, 217–18) describes the hypothetical scenario of the lone 
researcher who gets it right, but she does not make any contribution to 
the reliability of our scientific practice unless her success is also 
recognized as such by a community.
(8.) Here I draw on John Peacock’s account of this episode in Massimi 
and Peacock (2014).
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